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I. INTRODUCTION
"Under early English common law, noncompetition clauses .. .were
considered per se invalid on the ground that they caused undue personal
hardship and public injury."' While several states continue to ban such re-
strictive covenants,2 most states, Florida included, 3 generally enforce non-
compete agreements in employment.
4
This survey aims at assessing section 542.335 of the Florida Statutes
through the lens of a physician non-compete agreement. While some states
have invalidated such agreements on public policy grounds either by statute
5
or by common law,6 Florida usually upholds such agreements and has always
assessed their validity under the same statute governing all employment non-
compete agreements, section 542.335.'
Part II provides a brief history of Florida non-compete law, during
which time the law has seesawed between favoring and disfavoring such
restrictive covenants. Part III gives an overview of physician non-compete
agreements generally and offers reasons for either invalidating such cove-
nants altogether or narrowly restricting their impact on public policy
grounds. Part IV assesses how physician non-compete agreements have been
1. Derek W. Loeser, The Legal, Ethical, and Practical Implications of Noncompetition
Clauses: What Physicians Should Know Before They Sign, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 283, 285
(2003).
2. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-
703 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 217 (2010).
3. FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1) (2010).
4. William G. Porter II & Michael C. Griffaton, Using Noncompete Agreements to
Protect Legitimate Business Interests, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 194, 194 (2002).
5. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-2-113(3) (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2707
(2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12X (2009).
6. E.g., Murfreesboro Med. Clinic, P.A. v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674, 683 (Tenn. 2005)
(relying on public policy, the Supreme Court of Tennessee banned non-compete agreements
between physicians and their private employers), superseded by statute, Act of June 21, 2007,
2007 Tenn. Pub. Acts 487 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1-148).
7. See, e.g., 4UOrtho, L.L.C. v. Practice Partners, Inc., 18 So. 3d 41, 43-44 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Alvarez v. Rendon, 953 So. 2d 702, 712-13 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
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analyzed under Florida's current non-compete statute, section 542.335, and
explores how they unduly favor employers and unfairly treat physician-
employees bound by restrictive covenants. This article concludes that physi-
cian non-compete agreements should be construed as narrowly as lawyer
non-compete agreements are construed in Florida and for analogous public
policy reasons: The physician-patient relationship is entitled to the same
respect that the lawyer-client relationship is owed under Florida law.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FLORIDA NON-COMPETE LAW
A Florida Bar Journal article, Restrictive Covenants: Florida Returns
to the Original "Unfair Competition" Approach for the 21st Century,8 co-
authored by the Florida Senate, sponsor of the 1996 non-compete statute
section 542.335 of the Florida Statutes9 governing restrictive covenants in
employment to the present day, and by the Florida Bar's principal drafter of
the statute, (hereafter referred to as Grant and Steele), traced the history of
non-compete agreements under Florida law.10 The history can be divided
into the following time periods: pre-1953, when restrictive covenants were
interpreted under the common law doctrine known as the "rule of reason,"
which generally disfavored non-compete agreements in employment;"
1953-1990, when such covenants were governed by section 542.12, "the first
Florida statute to explicitly authorize contractual restrictions upon competi-
tion;""2 1990-1996, when restrictive covenants were governed by section
542.33 and were strictly construed; 3 and finally, 1996 to the present, during
which time restrictive covenants have been governed by section 542.335.
4
8. John A. Grant, Jr. & Thomas T. Steele, Restrictive Covenants: Florida Returns to the
Original "Unfair Competition" Approach for the 21st Century, 70 FLA. B.J. 53 (1996).
9. FLA. STAT. § 542.335 (2010).
10. See generally Grant & Steele, supra note 8.
11. See, e.g., Love v. Miami Laundry Co., 160 So. 32, 34 (Fla. 1935) (holding the en-
forcement of the non-compete agreement may "mean that the ... employee cannot procure
other employment" from a competitor covering the territory and serving the customers which
were covered and served by the employer, "and that he, together with his family, will become
a charge on the public" and '"[t]hat courts are reluctant to uphold contracts whereby an indi-
vidual restricts his right to earn a living at his chosen calling is well established."') (internal
quotations omitted).
12. Grant & Steele, supra note 8, at 53.
13. See, e.g., Hapney v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127, 131 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (finding that section 542.33 of the Florida Statutes, allowing for noncompetition
agreements, is "in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed"), disap-
proved on other grounds by Gupton v. Vill. Key & Saw Shop, Inc., 656 So. 2d 475 (Fla.
1995).
14. See FLA. STAT. § 542.335.
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Non-compete agreements are governed by the law "in effect at the time the
agreement was entered into.'
5
The attitude of Florida courts toward non-compete agreements pre-1953
is illustrated in Love v. Miami Laundry Co.,' 6 where the Supreme Court of
Florida refused, on public policy grounds, to enjoin former employees from
engaging in the service of driving laundry trucks belonging to competitors of
their former employer over certain routes in Dade County, Florida. 7 As
Love demonstrates, "Florida courts displayed an extreme distaste for agree-
ments that restricted competition, especially agreements between employers
and employees.
' ' 8
From 1953 to 1990, restrictive covenants in Florida were governed by
section 542.12.' 9 According to the Supreme Court of Florida, the goal of
section 542.12 was to "protect the legitimate interests of the employer."' In
addition, "[t]he statute is designed to allow employers to prevent their em-
ployees and agents from learning their trade secrets, befriending their cus-
tomers and then moving into competition with them.",2' Twice, the Supreme
Court of Florida upheld the constitutionality of section 542.12 against equal
protection and due process challenges.
Grant and Steele claim, "In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the
Florida courts lost sight of the original purpose of the statute and increasing-
ly employed a judicial approach to such agreements that emphasized a 'con-
tract-oriented' methodology and that abandoned the original 'unfair competi-
tion' theory of analysis and enforcement. 2'  Grant and Steele criticize the
pre-1990 period on the ground that "the 'contract-oriented' approach... led
to a hodge-podge of conflicting and unprincipled decisions. '' 4 By way of
contrast, however, in King v. Jessup,25 the Fifth District Court of Appeal
made clear that pre-1990, "a judicially-created presumption of irreparable
[harm] upon breach [of non-compete agreements] evolved., 26 In First Miami
15. See Bradley v. Health Coal., Inc., 687 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997),
superseded by statute, Act Effective July 1, 1996, ch. 96-257, §§ 1.3, 1996 Fla. Laws 983,
987.
16. 160 So. 32 (Fla. 1935).
17. Id. at 33-34.
18. Grant & Steele, supra note 8, at 53.
19. Id.
20. Capelouto v. Orkin Exterminating Co. of Fla., 183 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1966).
21. Miller Mech., Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1974).
22. Capelouto, 183 So. 2d at 534; see Standard Newspapers, Inc. v. Woods, 110 So. 2d
397, 399-400 (Fla. 1959).
23. Grant & Steele, supra note 8, at 53.
24. Id.
25. 698 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam).
26. !d. at 340.
[Vol. 35
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Securities, Inc. v. Bell,27 the Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that before
1990, "an employee's only challenge, based on unreasonableness, had to
focus on the time and geographic area, and a presumption of irreparable
harm flowed from any violation of the agreement."
28
In 1990, the Florida Legislature amended section 542.33 of the Florida
Statutes.29 Grant and Steele criticize section 542.33 because
[it] created a standardless "unreasonableness" defense; it created a
standardless "contrary to the public health, safety or welfare" de-
fense; it shifted the focus of enforcement to "irreparable injury;" it
erroneously suggested that a "customer list" need not be a trade
secret to be granted a measure of protection by contract; and it
specified narrow instances of presumptive "irreparable injury." 30
In short, Grant and Steele insist that section 542.33 "nowhere specifies
any objective standard for the courts to use in determining the 'reasonable-
ness' of a restriction upon competition. 31 In other words, Grant and Steele
reject the common law rule of reason that many states rely upon in assessing
the validity of restrictive covenants in employment agreements.32
In support of Grant and Steele's assessment of the 1990 non-compete
statute, the Fifth District noted that section 542.33 "eliminated the judicial
presumption by requiring a showing of irreparable injury before an injunc-
tion could be entered. 33
King illustrates how, during the period between 1990 and 1996, it was
harder for employers to enforce non-compete agreements by injunction.34 In
King, the Fifth District Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's finding that
the employer failed to show that he suffered irreparable injury stemming
from the physician-employee's breach of a covenant not to compete.35
27. 758 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam).
28. Id. at 1229 (citing Gupton v. Vill. Key & Saw Shop, Inc., 656 So. 2d 475, 478 (Fla.
1995)).
29. Act effective June 28, 1990, ch. 90-216, 1990 Fla. Laws 1607 (amending FLA. STAT.
§ 542.33 (1989)).
30. Grant & Steele, supra note 8, at 53 (quoting Act effective June 28, 1990, ch. 90-216,
1990 Fla. Laws 1607, 1607).
31. Id. at 54.
32. See id. at 55.
33. King v. Jessup, 698 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam).
34. See id. at 341.
35. Id. at 341.
5
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In Hapney v. Central Garage, Inc. ,36 the Second District Court of Ap-
peal noted how the 1990 non-compete statute, section 542.33 changed the
1953 non-compete statute, section 542.12:
We view the sweeping impact of this amendment to be threefold.
First, the presumption of irreparable injury ... is strictly curtailed.
Second, a test of reasonableness is injected into the enforcement
process because the amendment prohibits the enforcement of an
unreasonable covenant .... In determining the reasonableness of
such an agreement, the courts employ a balancing test to weigh the
employer's interest in preventing the competition against the op-
pressive effect on the employee." . . .[But] this balancing test [is]
limited... to duration and geographic area.... Third, the legisla-
ture has specifically identified and segregated for special treatment
covenants which protect trade secrets and customer lists and pro-
hibit solicitation of existing customers .... 37
Finally, since July 1, 1996, restrictive covenants in Florida have been
governed by section 542.335.38 Unsurprisingly, as the sponsors and drafters
of the statute, Grant and Steele think it strikes the proper balance between
protecting employers' "legitimate business interests" and any infringement
upon employees' rights to make a living.39 According to the Fifth District,
"[s]ection 542.335 contains a comprehensive framework for analyzing, eva-
luating and enforcing restrictive covenants" contained in employment con-
tracts.40
The thesis of this article is that while section 542.335 of the Florida
Statutes may well have reduced uncertainty when it comes to interpreting
restrictive covenants in employment, it unduly understates the interests of
employees in the following four ways:
36. 579 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), disapproved on other grounds by Gup-
ton v. Vill. Key & Saw Shop Inc., 656 So. 2d 475,(Fla. 1995).
37. Id. at 133-34 (quotations omitted). Compare FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (1989 & Supp.
1990), with FLA. STAT. § 542.12 (1953) (renumbered 1980).
38. See FLA. STAT. § 542.335 (2010).
39. Grant & Steele, supra note 8, at 55. The term "legitimate business interest" seems to
have originated in Florida from a Second District Court of Appeal decision. Hapney, 579 So.
2d at 134 (holding that a former employee should be barred from competing only if the em-
ployer had a "legitimate business interest" in avoiding such competition); see also Stanley H.
Eleff, Covenants Not to Compete Can Have Their Limitations, TAMPA BAY Bus. J. (Mar. 29,
2004, 12:00 AM),
http://tampabay.bizjoumals.com/tanpabay/stories/2004/03/29/focus4.htm?t=printable.
40. Henao v. Prof 1 Shoe Repair, Inc., 929 So. 2d 723, 726 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
(Vol. 35
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1) It shifts the usual burden of proving irreparable injury from the em-
ployer to the employee in assessing whether an injunction should be
granted;
41
2) "In determining the enforce[ment] of a restrictive covenant, a court
[s]hall not consider any individualized economic or other hardship that might
be caused to the [employee] ;,,42 in other words, the usual balancing of hard-
ships prongn-assessing whether an injunction should be issued-has been
altogether abandoned;"
3) "A court shall not employ any rule of contract construction that re-
quires the court to construe a restrictive covenant narrowly, against the re-
straint, or against the drafter... ;45 and
4) While paying lip service to the "public interest" prong for assessing
the validity of non-compete agreements, in fact, the public interest rarely, if
ever, has been relied upon to invalidate such restrictive covenants.46 Specifi-
cally, section 542.335 "gives absolutely no weight to how physician non-
compete agreements cause potential harm to patient choice and to the profes-
sional and ethical obligations of physicians to their patients. 47
Which party bears the burden of proof on an issue is often outcome de-
terminative: Under section 542.33, the employer bore the burden of proving
irreparable injury, a critical element in an effort to obtain an injunction. 48 By
contrast, under section 542.335, the former employee bears the burden of
proving that a violation of a non-compete agreement does not cause irrepara-
ble injury.49 As the Second District Court of Appeal put it:
[an employer] seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant by injunc-
tion need not directly prove that the [former employee's] specific
activities will cause irreparable injury if not enjoined. Rather, the
statute provides that "[t]he violation of an enforceable restrictive
covenant creates a presumption of irreparable injury to the person
seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant.,
5°
41. See FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)0).
42. Id. § 542.335(1)(g)1.
43. Miller Mech., Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1974).
44. See FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(g)1, (1)(i)-(j).
45. Id. § 542.335(l)(h).
46. See S. Elizabeth Wilbom Malloy, Physician Restrictive Covenants: The Neglect of
Incumbent Patient Interests, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 189, 194 n.23 (2006).
47. See id.; see generally FLA. STAT. § 542.335.
48. See FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a) (1989 & Supp. 1990).
49. Id. § 542.3350) (2010).
50. Am. II Elecs., Inc. v. Smith, 830 So. 2d 906, 908 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (quot-
ing FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)0) (2001)).
7
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This key difference between the 1990 and 1996 statutes turns the com-
mon law of equity on its head. It is black letter law that the party seeking an
injunction bears the burden of proving, among other things, that it will suffer
irreparable injury if the injunction is denied."
Even though no drafter of legislation can foresee all potential ambigui-
ties in proposed bills, the current controversies over 1) whether referral doc-
tors constitute a "'legitimate business interest"' under section 542.335;52 2)
whether attorney's fees are recoverable from or by a prevailing non-party
such as a rival employer;53 and 3) when access to confidential information
will support a broad restriction on former employees, 54 illustrates that uncer-
tainty and ambiguity continues to plague even the best efforts of lawmakers
to learn from the past.
I. PHYSICIAN NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT
The relative merits of physician non-compete agreements in employ-
ment may be summarized by comparing and contrasting the Supreme Court
of New Jersey case of Karlin v. Weinberg,55 and the Supreme Court of Ari-
zona case of Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber.56
Karlin involved "medical doctors engaged in the practice of dermatolo-
gy.,,"57 Dr. Weinberg's employment contract contained clauses barring him,
post-termination, from engaging in the practice of dermatology for five years
within a ten-mile radius of the site of his previous employer.58 Post-
termination, Dr. Weinberg opened a competing dermatology practice "just a
few doors" from his former employer where he treated sixty patients he had
51. Hiles v. Auto Bahn Fed'n, Inc., 498 So. 2d 997, 998 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(per curiam).
52. Fla. Hematology & Oncology Specialists v. Tummala (Tummala 11), 969 So. 2d 316,
316-17 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam) (Lewis, C.J., dissenting) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(b)
(2004)).
53. Compare Sun Grp. Enters., Inc. v. DeWitte, 890 So. 2d 410, 412 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2004) (holding appellees were entitled to attorney's fees), with Bauer v. DILIB, Inc., 16
So. 3d 318, 320 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (holding the plaintiff was not entitled to attor-
ney's fees).
54. Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon, 576 F.3d 1223, 1235 n.12 (1 1th Cir. 2009).
55. 390 A.2d 1161 (N.J. 1978).
56. 982 P.2d 1277 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc).
57. Karlin, 390 A.2d at 1163.
58. Id. at 1164 (reviewing the merits of the case, despite the restrictive covenant being
oral). Unlike Florida, which requires that non-compete agreements be in writing under section
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previously treated while employed by Dr. Karlin. 59 Dr. Karlin sued, seeking
both an injunction and damages.6"
The Supreme Court of New Jersey began its analysis by stating that:
[An employee's post-employment restrictive covenant is enforce-
able to the extent that it is reasonable under all the circumstances
of the case. A post-employment restrictive covenant will be found
to be reasonable when it protects the "legitimate" interests of the
employer, imposes no undue hardship on the employee, and is not
injurious to the public .... 6
The court proceeded to say that Dr. Karlin had:
[A legitimate] interest in protecting his ongoing relationship with
his patients. Dr. Karlin, by virtue of his efforts, expenditures and
reputation, has developed a significant practice, and only if the re-
strictive covenant is given effect can he hope to protect in some
measure his legitimate interest in preserving his ongoing relation-
ship with his patients.62
The court noted that "a mere showing of personal hardship does not
amount to an 'undue hardship' that would prevent enforcement of the cove-
nant.
, 63
Next, the court compared and contrasted lawyer non-compete agree-
ments with physician non-compete agreements. 64 While emphasizing "the
unique relationship between attorney and client," the court minimized the
physician-patient relationship: "While... some patients may have to travel
a greater distance to Dr. Weinberg's new office ... than they travelled to his
former office, no patient will, by force of law, automatically be deprived of
continuing his ongoing relationship with his physician. '"65 While recognizing
that the Supreme Court of New Jersey had adopted the American Bar Asso-
ciation rule prohibiting lawyer non-compete agreements in employment, it
noted, "The regulations governing physicians within this State, however, do
not contain any restriction similar to [the ABA prohibition on lawyer non-
compete agreements]. 66 The court refused to give weight to various prin-
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Karlin, 390 A.2d at 1166 (citations omitted).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1166 n.3 (citing Marvel v. Jonah, 90 A. 1004, 1005 (N.J. 1914)).
64. See id. at 1166-67.
65. Id. at 1167.
66. Karlin, 390 A.2d at 1167-68.
9
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ciples of medical ethics that had not been adopted by any governmental body
or court.67 Ironically, the Karlin court invoked public policy in support of
enforcing physician non-compete agreements in employment: Without such
restrictive covenants,
established physicians [would be] hesitant to employ younger as-
sociates and in turn deprive the younger physician of the opportu-
nity to gain experience and to husband the necessary resources
needed to establish a practice of his own. [Invalidating such cove-
nants] might discourage physicians from establishing partnerships,
thereby depriving the public of the potentially lower fees which
ordinarily flow from the economies of scale attendant upon a part-
nership operation. 6
8
In rejecting a per se rule in favor of a case-by-case determination of the
validity of physician non-compete agreements, the Karlin court did note that
a shortage of physicians within a restricted area should be taken into account
in assessing the reasonableness of such agreements. 69
In Valley Medical Specialists, a medical practice hired Dr. Farber, an in-
ternist and pulmonologist.7° "Dr. Farber became a shareholder and subse-
quently a minority officer and director" of the practice.71 Dr. Farber's em-
ployment contract contained a non-compete agreement, which he violated
when he left the practice and opened a new office within the restricted area.72
Noting the law's traditional disfavor towards non-compete agreements,
the Valley Medical Specialists court said:
This disfavor is particularly strong concerning such covenants
among physicians because the practice of medicine affects the
public to a much greater extent. In fact, "[f]or the past [sixty]
years, the American Medical Association (AMA) has consistently
taken the position that noncompetition agreements between physi-
cians impact negatively on patient care.",
7 3
67. See id. at 1168.
68. Id. at 1169.
69. Id. at 1170.
70. Valley Med. Specialists, 982 P.2d at 1278
71. Id. at 1279.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1281 (quoting Paula Berg, Judicial Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete
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Even though the agreement in Valley Medical Specialists was between
partners, the court said it was closer "to an employer-employee agreement
than a sale of a business. 7 4 The court went on to note that "[u]nequal bar-
gaining power may be a factor to consider when [assessing] the hardship on
the departing employee., 75 Most important to the court in Valley Medical
Specialists, however, was that "in cases involving the professions, public
policy concerns may outweigh any protectable interest the remaining firm
members may have. '76 Analogizing to lawyer non-compete agreements, the
Valley Medical Specialists court concluded that the physician-patient rela-
tionship was entitled to the same protection the law gives to the lawyer-client
relationship.7 Relying on public policy, the Valley Medical Specialists court
concluded:
that the doctor-patient relationship is special and entitled to unique
protection. It cannot be easily or accurately compared to relation-
ships in the commercial context. In light of the great public policy
interest involved in covenants not to compete between physicians,
each agreement will be strictly construed for reasonableness. 8
In assessing the validity of physician non-compete agreements in em-
ployment contracts, commentators, and courts have listed factors the law
should consider:
1) whether the covenant goes beyond preventing a doctor from practic-
ing the specialty performed by the employer;
2) whether the duration of the restriction is longer than the typical
treatment interval of patients in the specialty;
3) whether the restriction unduly interferes with patients' right to con-
tinue seeing the doctor of their choice by requiring patients to travel an un-
reasonable distance to see the doctor;
4) whether enforcement of the covenant would result in a shortage of
doctors practicing the particular specialty in the area;
5) whether enforcement of the covenant would grant a monopoly over a
specialty in an area to the employer for the duration of the restriction; and
6) whether enforcement of the covenant would bar doctors from engag-
ing in activities not in competition with their former employers.79
74. Id. at 1282.
75. Valley Med. Specialists, 982 P.2d at 1282.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1283.
78. Id.
79. See Elizabeth Williams, Cause of Action to Enforce Anticompetition Covenant in
Employment Contract, in 11 CAUSES OF AcTION 375,398-401 (2009).
11
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IV. SECTION 542.335
A. Non-Compete Agreements Must Be in Writing
Under section 542.335(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes, a non-compete
agreement must be in writing and signed by the former employee.8" Several
Florida cases address this issue. In Sanz v. R.T. Aerospace Corp.,8' the Third
District Court of Appeal concluded that an employee was not bound by his
non-compete agreement after the three-year term of his written contract ex-
pired, and he continued working under an oral agreement.82 Similarly, in
Gray v. Prime Management Group, Inc.,83 the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal concluded that an oral extension of the company's president's written
employment contract did not apply to his non-compete agreement.84 In Zup-
nik v. All Florida Paper, Inc.,85 the Third District Court of Appeal ruled that
"post-termination restrictions expire upon the termination of [a contract] for
a specific term, even if [the] employee remains an at-will employee after the
[contract term ends]. 86
B. What Constitutes a "Legitimate Business Interest?"
Even today, under Florida's current "pro-employer" non-compete sta-
tute, an employer may not enforce a noncompetition agreement restriction on
a former employee simply to eliminate competition per se, but rather an em-
ployer must establish a legitimate business interest to be protected.87
1. Valuable Confidential or Professional Information That Otherwise Is
Not a Trade Secret
As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out in Proudfoot Con-
sulting Co. v. Gordon,88 there is a split of authority in Florida on when confi-
dential information accessible by employees will support a broad restriction
barring former employees from working for a rival.89 AutoNation, Inc. v.
80. FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(a) (2010).
81. 650 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
82. Id. at 1059-60.
83. 912 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam).
84. Id. at 713-14.
85. 997 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
86. Id. at 1238.
87. See FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(b) (2010).
88. 576 F.3d 1223 (11 th Cir. 2009).
89. Id. at 1235 n.12.
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O'Brien9" held "that the employee's access to confidential information...
justified a restriction against work for a competitor where the employee was
in a position at his new employer to use that information to unfairly compete
against his former employer."
9 t
By contrast, Grant and Steele "suggest that in determining whether an
employee's knowledge of confidential information justifies a restriction
against work for a competitor, courts should look to the definition of threat-
ened misappropriation used in trade secrets law."92
While acknowledging that the "principle of inevitable disclosure would
appear to impose a higher standard than the approach set out in O'Brien," the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that "it is unclear if, in practice, the application
of [these] two standards would produce different results. 93
In AutoNation, Inc. v. Maki,94 the Florida Circuit Court noted that an
analysis of whether an employee has the ability to use confidential informa-
tion to compete unfairly against a former employer is "an objective one."95
2. Substantial Relationships with Specific Prospective or Existing Cus-
tomers, Patients, or Clients
As the Third District Court of Appeal put it in Bradley v. Health Coali-
tion, Inc. ,96 "[t]he purpose of the [1990 non-compete statute] is to prevent an
employee from taking advantage of a customer relationship which was de-
veloped during the term of the employee's employment. '
There is a consensus in Florida on the question of whether a former
physician violates a non-compete agreement when she places an advertise-
ment announcing her new business address.98 While such ads are a form of
solicitation, they are not direct solicitation and therefore not in violation of a
non-compete agreement.99
90. 347 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
91. Proudfoot Consulting Co., 576 F.3d at 1235 n. 12 (discussing O'Brien, 347 F. Supp.
2d at 1305-08).
92. Id. (citing Grant & Steele, supra note 8, at 54-55).
93. Id. at 1236 n.12 (discussing O'Brien, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 1305-08).
94. No. 03-18896 CACE(03), 2004 WL 1925479 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 25, 2004), affd per
curiam, Maki v. AutoNation, Inc., 895 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
95. Id. at *5.
96. 687 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997), superseded by statute, Act effective
July 1, 1996, ch. 96-257, §§ 1, 3, 1996 Fla. Laws 983,987.
97. Id. at 334-35.
98. See, e.g., Lotenfoe v. Pahk, 747 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999); King
v. Jessup, 698 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam).
99. See, e.g., Lotenfoe, 747 So. 2d at 424 (finding that an ad by former physician-
employee was not a direct solicitation of former employer-physician's patients); King, 698 So.
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Currently, there is a district court of appeal split over whether "referring
physicians" are a legitimate business interest in the hematology and oncolo-
gy context. 1° Supreme Court of Florida Justice Lewis succinctly summed up
this controversy when he dissented from the majority's decision not to re-
solve this issue.'' In Florida Hematology & Oncology v. Tummala (Tumma-
la 1),102 the Fifth District Court of Appeal ruled that "referral physicians" are
not a legitimate business interest.10 3 That court made clear that referring
physicians secure a "stream of unidentified prospective patients."' ' In doing
so, the Fifth District acknowledged "that this holding... appear[s] to con-
flict with [Torregrosa],"'05 where the Third District Court of Appeal con-
cluded that "referral physicians" do constitute legitimate business interest
worthy of protection under section 542.335.'06 While Supreme Court of
Florida Justice Lewis left no doubt that he believed "referral physicians" are
a legitimate business interest under section 542.335(l)(b), a majority of the
Supreme Court of Florida dismissed the appeal in Tummala I as improvident-
ly granted."0 7
In Tummala I, an oncologist's employment contract included a restric-
tive covenant barring him from competing for two years after he left the
practice, within a radius of fifteen miles of his former employment.0 8 After
resigning, Tummala opened a competing oncology practice within the re-
stricted geographic area, and his former employer sued to enforce the non-
compete agreement.' °9 While Tummala scrupulously avoided providing
medical services directly to any of his former employer's existing patients,
he did accept patient referrals from family physicians, internists, and general
practitioners, who refer their patients to specialists."0  Tummala's former
2d at 341 (finding that an ad placed by former employee in local newspaper announcing his
new business address is not direct solicitation in violation of non-compete agreement).
100. Compare Fla. Hematology & Oncology v. Tummala (Tummala 1), 927 So. 2d 135,
137-38 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006), review dismissed by Tummala II, 969 So. 2d 316, 316-
17 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam), with Southernmost Foot & Ankle Specialists, P.A. v. Torregrosa,
891 So. 2d 591, 594 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
101. See Tummala II, 969 So. 2d at 316-18 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
102. 927 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006), review dismissed by Tummala II, 969
So. 2d 316 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam).
103. Id. at 139.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 139 n.4.
106. Southernmost Foot & Ankle Specialists, P.A. v. Torregrosa, 891 So. 2d 591, 594
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
107. See Tummala II, 969 So. 2d 316, 316 (Fla. 2007).
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firm proved that its volume of referrals from existing referral physicians
plunged seventy percent since Tummala opened his competing practice."'
Relying upon the First District Court of Appeal's decision in University
of Florida Board of Trustees v. Sanal,"' which held that before a relationship
with a prospective patient could constitute a legitimate business interest, that
relationship must be specific and identifiable,113 the trial court in Tummala I
declined to enjoin the defendant from competing with his former practice or
from securing referral patients from the same referral physicians." 4 Despite
acknowledging that such referral physicians were a vital source of patients,
the trial court argued that since Tummala was not directly providing services
to any existing patients, he was not infringing upon any "'specific prospec-
tive and existing' patients."'1 5 If unknown prospective patients cannot con-
stitute legitimate business interests, the Tummala I court reasoned, then nei-
ther can the doctors who refer them to specialists: "'[T]he lack of [a specific
and identifiable] relationship with a patient does not become a legitimate
business interest simply by virtue of being referred by a physician.""
1 6
As one critic of the Tummala I ruling put it:
[Tummala 1] is a stunning curtailment of the scope of Florida
Statute [section] 542.335. Worse, the rationale for refusing to pro-
tect an employer's interest in its referral relationships is not limited
to the medical profession. Any business or profession which rece-
ives clients, customers or patients from referral relationships de-
veloped, nurtured and maintained by the business will, at least in
the Fifth District, be unable to protect those relationships by use of
restrictive covenant. 17
In Southernmost Foot & Ankle Specialists v. Torregrosa, P.A.,18 the
Third District Court of Appeal concluded, "The trial court properly found...
that the restrictive covenant was reasonably necessary to protect Southern-
111. Initial Brief of Appellants at 9, Fla. Hematology & Oncology v. Tummala, 927 So. 2d
135 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (No. 5DO5-1950).
112. 837 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
113. Tummala 1, 927 So. 2d at 139 (citing Sanal, 837 So. 2d at 515-16).
114. Id.
115. See id. at 138-39.
116. Id. at 139 (citing Sanal, 837 So. 2d at 515-16).
117. H. Gregory McNeill, Restrictive Covenants: The New Loophole, THE BmFS, Nov.
2007, at 16.
118. 891 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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most's legitimate business interests in its patient base, referral doctors, spe-




In the absence of resolution of this conflict by the Supreme Court of
Florida, Justice Lewis urged the Florida Legislature to clarify the law on this
issue. 2 °
3. Customer, Patient, or Client Goodwill
As case law makes clear, a former employer has a legitimate business
interest in its patients which it can protect against a physician who violates
an enforceable non-compete agreement. 121
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Janss, 2 2 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's injunction against a pacemaker salesman who by "his contacts with
former customers [prescribing physicians]," he "plainly tried to trade on
Medtronic' s-[his former employer]-goodwill. ' 23
In Kephart v. Hair Returns, Inc.,' 24 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
ruled that a non-compete agreement cannot bar a former employee from ser-
vicing "customers who voluntarily follow an employee to her new place of
employment." 25
In Austin v. Mid State Fire Equipment of Central Florida, Inc.,126 the
Fifth District Court of Appeal barred the former employee from soliciting
customers of his former employer but did not bar the employee from work-
ing for a competitor.1
7
119. Id. at 594. In Open Magnetic Imaging, Inc. v. Nieves-Garcia, the Third District
Court of Appeal again upheld the trial court's finding that the employer had a legitimate busi-
ness interest in its referral doctors. 826 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (per
curiam).
120. Tummala 1!, 969 So. 2d 316, 318 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam) (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
121. E.g., Supinski v. Omni Healthcare, P.A., 853 So. 2d 526, 531 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2003).
122. 729 F.2d 1395 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
123. Id. at 1401.
124. 685 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
125. Id. at 960 (emphasis added).
126. 727 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
127. Id. at 1098.
[Vol. 35
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss1/3
2010] FLORIDA SURVEY OF PHYSICIAN NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS 79
4. Extraordinary or Specialized Training
An employer's right to protect his investment in an employee's training
was addressed by the Second District Court of Appeal under the 1990 non-
compete statute in Hapney v. Central Garage, Inc. :128
To constitute a protectable interest, however, the providing of
training or education must be extraordinary .... The third category
is difficult to define with any degree of precision .... [I]t is gener-
ally required that the employer provide more in training than that
acquired by simply performing the tasks associated with a job....
The precise degree of training or education which rises to the level
of a protectible [sic] interest will vary from industry to industry
and is a factual determination to be made by the trial court.1
29
C. Employer's Prima Facie Case
1. Rebuttable Presumptions
"'The violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant creates a pre-
sumption of irreparable injury to the person seeking enforcement of a restric-
tive covenant."" 3  Although "[t]his presumption is rebuttable, not conclu-
sive," it is rare indeed for a former employee to successfully rebut this pre-
sumption. 3' A common way to rebut this presumption, however, is for the
employee to prove that damages are readily calculable.'32 What is clear is
that Florida law does not require the employer to prove that the former em-
ployee intentionally breached a restrictive covenant in order for the employer
to obtain an injunction.'33
128. 579 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), disapproved on other grounds by Gup-
ton v. Vill. Key & Saw Shop Inc., 656 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1995).
129. Id. at 132.
130. Litwinczuk v. Palm Beach Cardiovascular Clinic, L.C., 939 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)j) (2006)). Whether a restrictive cove-
nant has been violated is a question of fact. See id.
131. Id.; see also Passalacqua v. Naviant, Inc., 844 So. 2d 792, 796 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2003).
132. See, e.g., First Miami Sec., Inc. v. Bell, 758 So. 2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (per curiam).
133. Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon, 576 F.3d 1223, 1239 (1lth Cir. 2009).
17
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According to section 542.335(1)(d)1 of the Florida Statutes, "In the case of a
restrictive covenant sought to be enforced against a former employee... a
court shall presume reasonable in time any restraint 6 months or less in dura-
tion and shall presume unreasonable in time any restraint more than 2 years
in duration."'' 3
4
2. Rules of Construction
Under section 542.335(l)(h) of the Florida Statutes:
A court shall construe a restrictive covenant in favor of providing
reasonable protection to all legitimate business interests estab-
lished by the person seeking enforcement. A court shall not em-
ploy any rule of contract construction that requires the court to
construe a restrictive covenant narrowly, against the restraint, or
against the drafter of the contract.' 35
D. Employee's Burden of Proof
Once the employer establishes a prima facie case that a restrictive cove-
nant is reasonably necessary, the employee "has the burden of establishing
that the [restriction] is overbroad, overlong, or otherwise not reasonably ne-
cessary.' 136 Litwinczuk v. Palm Beach Cardiovascular Clinic, LC. 137 illu-
strates just how hard it is for a physician-employee to overcome the pre-
sumption of irreparable harm once the former employer proves the existence
of one or more "legitimate business interests."' 138
E. Employee Defenses
In a 2004 Florida Bar Journal article, N. James Turner offered em-
ployees advice and strategies for defending against non-compete agree-
ments. 39  Turner suggests that the restricted employee try a preemptive
strike-file a declaratory judgment action-"which should seek a determina-
tion of the enforceability of the noncompete agreement and a declaration of
134. FLA. STAT. § 542.335(l)(d)(1) (2010).
135. Id. § 542.335(l)(h).
136. Anich Indus., Inc. v. Raney, 751 So. 2d 767, 770 n.2 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000);
FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(c).
137. 939 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
138. See id. at 271-72.
139. See N. James Turner, Successfully Defending Employees in Noncompete and Trade
Secret Litigation, 78 FLA. B.J. 43, 44-46 (2004).
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its invalidity."'"' But, as the Eleventh Circuit made clear in Proudfoot, it is
no defense that "an employee reasonably believed that his conduct did not
violate the restrictive covenants at issue.'
' 41
1. Employer's Breach of Contract
Turner notes:
[I]t is generally easier to convince a court of a prior material
breach if the noncompete covenant is part of an overall employ-
ment contract which contains compensation and other provisions
which were arguably breached, than if the covenant is a stand-
alone agreement. It is generally easier to prove the breach of an
explicit term of the contract than an implied term, such as a re-
quirement of existing law. 142
Turner notes "[t]he employer's failure to pay compensation under a
contract of employment is the most common material breach available as a
defense to employees who have previously signed noncompete agreements.
Florida courts have regularly denied injunctive relief in these situations." '43
If an employer breaches the employment contract first, "'the general rule is
that a material breach ... allows the non-breaching party to treat the breach
as a discharge of [her] contract liability. '""44 Florida courts have accepted
the following kinds of employer breaches that will serve to release the for-
mer employee from obligations contained in the non-compete agreement: 1)
"refusing to credit [a physicians with all ... services performed in calculat-
ing her bonus; 145 2) evidence that the former employer sexually harassed the
former employee;'" Turner notes that an employer's "[flail[ure] to pay an
140. Id. at 46.
141. Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon, 576 F.3d 1223, 1239 (1lth Cir. 2009). The
Eleventh Circuit noted that all Florida court cases "referring to an 'intent' element" were
decided under an earlier version of the state's non-compete statute. Id. at 1239-40.
142. Turner, supra note 139, at 46.
143. Id. at 45.
144. Benemerito & Flores, M.D.'s, P.A. v. Roche, 751 So. 2d 91, 93 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (quoting Bradley v. Health Coal., Inc., 687 So. 2d 329, 333 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1997), supersceeded by statute, Act effective July 1, 1996, ch. 96-257, §§ 1,3 1996 Fla. Laws
983,987).
145. Id. at 94.
146. Harrison v. Palm Harbor MRI, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1117, 1119 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1997).
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employee in accordance with the [Fair Labor Standards Act]" is an often-
neglected source of an employer's prior breach of contract.'47
2. Employer's Unclean Hands
Since an injunction is an equitable remedy, equitable defenses such as
unclean hands and latches may be raised to successfully defeat an employer's
efforts to obtain a temporary injunction.1 48 Bradley provides an example of
how a physician was released from his promise not to compete by showing
unclean hands on the part of the employer. 149
3. Intervening Changes in the Employee's Job Duties
Intervening changes in an employee's job duties and/or compensation
have served, in other jurisdictions, to terminate the employment agreement
that includes the non-compete clause when it is replaced with an agreement
lacking one. 5 ° There is no reason such an employee defense would not work
in Florida as well.
4. Waiver
If the restricted employee can demonstrate that "the former employer
[never] enforced the non-compete agreement in the past against other em-
ployees," she may argue that the employer has waived the right to enforce it
against her. 1 '
5. Lack of Consideration
"Courts will not enforce a non-compete [agreement if] there is no con-
sideration. 15 1 States vary, however, "on whether the continuation of at-will
employment of a physician is sufficient consideration for a non-compete
147. Turner, supra note 139, at 45-46.
148. See id. at 46.
149. Bradley v. Health Coal., Inc., 687 So. 2d 329, 334 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997),
superseded by statute, Act effective July 1, 1996, ch. 96-257, §§ 1, 3 1996 Fla. Laws 983,
987.
150. See, e.g., Lycos, Inc. v. Jackson, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 256 (Super. Ct. 2004); AFC Cable
Sys., Inc. v. Clisham, 62 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Mass. 1999).
151. Katherine Benesch, Update on Covenants Not to Compete: Will They Survive in the
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agreement.' 15 3 Some states require that "additional consideration, not the
mere continuation of employment, must be given to support a restrictive co-
venant once employment has begun."'" Other states have "recognized con-




Even under Florida's original non-compete statute, section 542.12 of
the Florida Statutes, it was recognized that the normal remedy for breach of
a non-compete agreement was an injunction. 56 This is so "'because of the
inherently difficult, although not impossible, task of determining just what
damage actually is caused by the employee's breach of the agreement."" 57
Florida courts have not been consistent in identifying the elements ne-
cessary to be proven before an injunction will be issued. 158 For example, in
Environmental Services, Inc. v. Carter,59 the Fifth District Court of Appeal
of Florida lists four requirements for a temporary injunction.' 6 By contrast,
in Litwinczuk, the court listed five requirements for a temporary injunction. 161
In re Estate of Barsanti,61 the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida
noted that the party seeking a temporary injunction must demonstrate that:
"1) immediate and irreparable harm will otherwise result, 2) the moving par-
ty [has] a clear legal right thereto, 3) [the moving party has] no adequate
remedy at law and 4) the public interest will not be disserved.' '163 Of the four
elements, it is typically irreparable injury and substantial likelihood of suc-




156. See, e.g., Capelouto v. Orkin Exterminating Co. of Fla., 183 So. 2d 532, 535 (Fla.
1966).
157. Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon, 576 F.3d 1223, 1241 n.21 (lth Cir. 2009)
(quoting Miller Mech., Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1974)).
158. Compare Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Carter, 9 So. 3d 1258, 1261 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2009), with Litwinczuk v. Palm Beach Cardiovascular Clinic, L.C., 939 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006), and In re Estate of Barsanti, 773 So. 2d 1206, 1208 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (per curiam).
159. 9 So. 3d 1258 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
160. Id. at 1261.
161. Litwinczuk, 939 So. 2d at 271.
162. 773 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam).
163. Id. at 1208.
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fourth factor, the public interest, rarely has much impact, since most cases
involve purely commercial issues between private parties."'
164
a. Irreparable Injury and Inadequate Legal Remedy
Under the common law of equity, the equitable remedy of an injunction
is not available if the legal remedy is adequate. 165 The usual way of proving
the inadequacy of the legal remedy, when it comes to injunctions, is to prove
irreparable injury. 166 As one Florida court put it, an injunction is the usual
remedy for breach of non-compete agreements because "it is extremely diffi-
cult for a court to determine what damages are caused by breach of the cove-
nant."'67 In Masters Freight, Inc. v. Servco, Inc.,168 the Second District Court
of Appeal of Florida discussed the necessity of weighing all the factors for
the granting of a temporary injunction, including irreparable injury, in the
context of non-compete agreements. 
69
b. No Balancing of the Hardships
Under Florida's original non-compete statute, section 542.12, courts of
equity retained the power to "employ a balancing test to weigh the employ-
er's interest in preventing the competition against the oppressive effect on
the employee."'70
In sharp contrast, sections 542.335(1)(g) and (1)(g)(1) state: "In deter-
mining the enforceability of a restrictive covenant, a court: Shall not consid-
er any individualized economic or other hardship that might be caused to the
person against whom enforcement is sought.' 17 1 In utter disregard of the
common law elements that must be proved to obtain a temporary injunction,
Florida's non-compete statute leaves no doubt that whatever hardship a re-
strictive covenant has on the former employee, such hardship is irrelevant.
So, if obeying the injunction means the former employee must relocate out-
164. Alan B. Rosenthal, Enforcement of Noncompete Agreements, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS
DIG., Nov. 13, 2006, http://www.physiciansnews.com/2006/11/13/enforcement-of-
noncompete-agreements/.
165. Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Carter, 9 So. 3d 1258, 1261 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
166. See id. at 1261-62.
167. Id. at 1261 (citing Sentry Ins. V. Dunn, 411 So. 2d 336, 336 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1982)).
168. 915 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
169. Id. at 666-67.
170. Miller Mech., Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1974) (citing Capelouto v. Orkin
Exterminating Co. of Fla., 183 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1966)).
171. FIA. STAT. § 542.335 (1)(g)(1)(2010).
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side the restricted area, these costs are not to be taken into account.72 By
contrast, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in New Castle Orthopedic As-
sociates v. Burns,'173 invalidated a physician non-compete agreement in part
because, in balancing the hardships, the court concluded that greater harm
would result from issuing the injunction than from its denial. 174
c. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits
A temporary injunction is issued pre-trial by a court of equity sitting
without a jury. 175  Solely on the basis of affidavits, the judge must guess
which party is likely to prevail on the merits of the case in the event it
proceeds to trial. 176 Usually, the party seeking the injunction bears the bur-
den of proving this element by a preponderance of the evidence.
77
Certainly under earlier versions of Florida's non-compete statute, it was
generally accepted that before a temporary injunction would be issued, the
employer must prove a substantial likelihood of success on the merits in the
event the case goes to trial.
78
As the Fifth District Court of Appeal makes clear, when an employer
cannot prove a legitimate business interest, it cannot satisfy the substantial
likelihood of success element for obtaining a preliminary injunction. 179 As
the Fourth District Court of Appeal put it, whether the employer breached the
employment contract first also relates to whether the employer has a substan-
tial likelihood of success on the merits. 8 ° In JonJuan Salon, Inc. v. Acos-
ta,'81 the Fourth District discussed the substantial "likelihood of success on
172. See id.
173. 392 A.2d 1383 (Pa. 1978).
174. Id. at 1385-86.
175. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(a).
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See, e.g., Sarasota Beverage Co. v. Johnson, 551 So. 2d 503, 508 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1989), superseded by statute, FLA. STAT. § 542.335 (2009) (rejecting the notion that
success on the merits, a traditional requirement for injunction, need not be considered in an
employment non-compete case and noting that under the 1989 non-compete statute, section
542.33 of the Florida Statutes, it is proper to consider the likelihood that the movant will
succeed on the merits).
179. Anich Indus., Inc. v. Raney, 751 So. 2d 767, 770 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
180. Benemerito & Flores, M.D.'s, P.A. v. Roche, 751 So. 2d 91, 93 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (citing Cordis Corp. v. Prooslin, 482 So. 2d 486, 489 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1986)).
181. 922 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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the merits" element in assessing an employer's right to a temporary injunc-
tion."'
d. The Public Interest
As one critic of physician non-compete agreements put it:
[C]ourts must modify the traditional rule of reason test in future
evaluation of physician restrictive covenants. Courts must consid-
er the impact that enforcement of restrictive covenants will have
on the relationships between physicians and their patients within
the public-interest prong of the rule of reason analysis ...
[C]ourts must weigh the potential harm to patient choice and to the
professional and ethical obligations of physicians to their pa-
tients. 18
3
While section 542.335(1)(g)4 states that a court "[s]hall consider the ef-
fect of enforcement upon the public health, safety, and welfare,"' 84 section
542.335(l)(i) states:
No court may refuse enforcement of an otherwise enforceable re-
strictive covenant on the ground that the contract violates public
policy unless such public policy is articulated specifically by the
court and the court finds that the specified public policy require-
ments substantially outweigh the need to protect the legitimate
business interest or interests established by the person seeking en-
forcement of the restraint. 185
Though section 458.301 expressly recognizes the importance of patients
"mak[ing] an informed choice when selecting a physician," 186 I have found
only one case citing this source of public policy in a physician non-compete
case, and it was decided under the 1991 version of the Florida Statutes.
187
As H. Gregory McNeill put it in Restrictive Covenants: The New Loo-
phole, while asserting that an injunction will "'adversely affect the public
health, safety and welfare"' is a valid defense under Florida law, it almost
182. Id. at 1083.
183. S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Physician Restrictive Covenants: The Neglect of In-
cumbent Patient Interests, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 189, 194 (2006).
184. FLA. STAT. § 542.335(l)(g)4 (2010).
185. Id. § 542.335(1)(i).
186. Id. § 458.301.
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never works.188 In fact, "[o]ver the last 30 years, doctors have been enjoined
as often as former employees in any other business or profession. It is a rare
circumstance that doctors are able to avoid enforcement of a restrictive cove-
nant based upon the public interest argument.'
' 89
By contrast, courts in other states have considered whether the en-
forcement of a restrictive covenant would cause a shortage of specialists in
the restricted area in invalidating non-compete agreements on public policy
grounds.19°
When it comes to lawyer non-compete agreements in Florida, however,
an Ethics Opinion makes clear that under Rules 4-1.4, 4-1.5(g), and 4-5.6(a)
of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Florida Bar, such restrictive co-
venants should be narrowly construed on grounds of protecting the lawyer-
client relationship. 9' "The 'special trust and confidence' inherent in an at-
torney-client relationship dictates 'that clients be given greater freedom to
change legal representatives than might be tolerated in other employment
relationships.' ' 192 Moreover, "prohibiting a departing attorney from attempt-
ing to hire other lawyers from the firm, [such a covenant] restricts the right
of association between attorneys and, indirectly, the right to practice." 93 The
same solicitude Florida law bestows on the lawyer-client relationship should
apply with equal force to the physician-patient relationship especially in light
of section 458.301 which evidences Florida's public policy recognizing the
special status of the physician-patient relationship.
188. McNeill supra note 117, at 15 n.t (quoting FLA. STAT. § 542.335(l)(g)(4)).
189. Id. (citing Jewett Orthopaedic Clinic, P.A. v. White, 629 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
190. See, e.g., Idbeis v. Wichita Surgical Specialists., P.A., 112 P.3d 81, 92 (Kan. 2005)
(discussing that while the Supreme Court of Kansas upheld a physician non-compete agree-
ment, the Court also suggested that restrictive covenants in medically necessary specialties
might be unenforceable if the community would be left with a shortage in that specialty); New
Castle Orthopedic Assocs. v. Bums, 392 A.2d 1383, 1388 (Pa. 1978) (explaining how the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a non-compete agreement between an orthopedic
practice and its former physician employee would not be enforced, mainly on the grounds that
there was a shortage of orthopedic specialists in the geographic areas encompassed by the
non-compete agreement).
191. Fla. Bar Prof'l Ethics Comm., Op. 93-4 (1995).
192. Id. (quoting Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1021 (Fla. 1982)).
193. Id. (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'I Responsibility, Informal Op. 1417
(1978)). While no Florida case expressly addresses lawyer non-compete agreements in em-
ployment, cases from other jurisdictions provide the typical public policy justifications for
rendering such restrictive covenants among lawyers per se unreasonable and therefore void as
contrary to public policy. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Jung (Dwyer 1), 336 A.2d 498, 500 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), afftd, 348 A.2d 208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (per curiam); Cohen
v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. 1989).
25
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Public policy also comes into play when assessing non-compete agree-
ments entered into in other states, but effective in Florida, or when such
agreements are executed in Florida but take effect in other states. Several
Florida cases have addressed these issues. 94 In Palmer & Cay, Inc. v. Marsh
& McLennan Cos., 95 a panel of the Eleventh Circuit, strictly construing non-
compete agreements, ruled Georgia's public policy strictly construing non-
compete agreements superseded the public policy of other states with more
substantial contacts. 96 Authors of a Florida Bar Journal article make the
case that:
Under the apparently sweeping holding of Palmer & Cay, a Flori-
da employer who entered into a non-compete, valid under [Florida
Statutes] section 542.335, with an employee living and working in
Florida, could potentially be precluded from enforcing that con-
tract in Florida, by the decision of a Georgia state or federal court
having no prior connection to the employer, the employee, or the
contract.
97
What should Florida courts do when faced with enforcing a non-
compete agreement executed in another state that contains provisions that
violate Florida's public policy? In Cerniglia v. C. & D. Farms, Inc.,' 98 the
Supreme Court of Florida directly confronted the question of whether a non-
compete agreement, contrary to Florida public policy, is unenforceable only
in Florida or in its entirety.' 99 The Court concluded that "Florida's public
policy and statutes cannot be applied to a foreign contract to void its opera-
tion elsewhere. If performance, in Florida, of a foreign made contract is re-
pugnant to our public policy it is unenforceable here, but not necessarily void
or unenforceable in other jurisdictions."2" Finally, in Harris v. Gonzalez, 201
the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled, "Although ... Florida cannot ap-
ply its public policy and statutes to a foreign contract to void its operation
194. See e.g Cerniglia v. C. & D. Farms, Inc., 203 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1967) (per curiam);
Harris v. Gonzalez, 789 So. 2d 405, 409 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
195. 404 F.3d 1297 (lth Cir. 2005).
196. See id. at 1309.
197. Courtney B. Wilson & Donald W. Benson, Outrunning Contractual Noncompete
Undertakings: Does the 11 th Circuit's Palmer & Cay Decision Offer "Earlybird Specials"
for Florida Forum Shoppers?, 79 FLA. B.J. 55, 55 (2005).
198. 203 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1967) (per curiam).
199. Id. at2.
200. Id.
201. 789 So. 2d405 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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elsewhere, it can hold such a contract void or unenforceable here if said con-
tract is repugnant to the public policy of this state.
202
e. Injunction Bond
Section 542.335(1)(j) of the Florida Statutes makes clear that no tempo-
rary injunction shall be entered unless the employer posts a bond and the
court will not enforce "any contractual provision waiving the requirement of
an injunction bond or limiting the amount of such bond. °203 In Supinski v.
Omni Healthcare, P.A. ,24 the Fifth District Court of Appeal remanded the
case to the trial court, ordering it to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding
the amount of the injunction bond.0 5 Similarly, in Lotenfoe v. Pahk,°6 the
Second District Court of Appeal ruled that the lower court erred in issuing a
temporary injunction without conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine
the amount of the bond.20 7 When no evidentiary hearing is held, the defen-
dant's damages for being wrongfully enjoined are not limited to the amount
of the posted bond.20 8
2. Modifying Overbroad, Overlong, or Unreasonable Terms in the Non-
Compete Agreement: Section 542.335(1)(c)
Some critics urge courts not to modify unreasonable restrictive cove-
nants and to refuse to enforce them.209 For example, in Valley Medical Spe-
cialists, the Supreme Court of Arizona noted,"Although we will tolerate ig-
noring severable portions of a covenant to make it more reasonable, we will
not permit courts to add terms or rewrite provisions. '210 A court cannot "re-
write and create a restrictive covenant significantly different from that
created by the parties. ' '21
By contrast, section 542.335(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes, expressly au-
thorizes courts to modify overbroad, overlong, and unreasonable terms in a
202. Id. at409; see also FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(i) (2010).
203. FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)0).
204. 853 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
205. Id. at 532.
206. 747 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
207. See id. at 426.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument for
Specificity in Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REv. 672, 674 (2008) (urging courts not to
blue pencil unreasonable restrictive covenants).
210. Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc).
211. Id.
27
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non-compete agreement.2" 2 Common sense dictates that if an employer pro-
vides a particular product or service that is commonly available, a statewide
restriction is likely unreasonable. But, if a product or service is unique, ar-
guably a statewide, even a multi-state regional restriction, may be enforcea-
ble. But the most commonly enforced geographic restriction would be bar-
ring an employee from competing within the same county where her former
employer is located.213 In one case, Proudfoot Consulting Co., the Eleventh
Circuit upheld a geographic restriction that extended beyond the United
States to include Canada and even Europe.214
Litwinczuk illustrates the typical way a court may modify an overbroad
restrictive covenant in a non-compete agreement." 5 In this case, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal noted that the trial court properly reduced the geo-
graphic area subject to the restrictive covenant from the entire Palm Beach
County to an area "from the southernmost boundaries of the City of West
Palm Beach north to the Martin County line., 216 Similarly, in Open Magnet-
ic Imaging, Inc. v. Nieves-Garcia,217 even though the non-compete agreement
barred the former employee from competing in three counties, the court nar-
rowed the geographic limitation to the only county the former employee ever
worked in.218
While Florida's non-compete statute makes it clear that a court has the
power to modify overbroad, overlong or unreasonable terms in a non-
compete agreement, courts have interpreted this language to include the
court's power to add terms. 219 For example, even if a non-compete agree-
ment omits altogether the geographic area subject to the restrictive covenant,
a court can insert what it regards as a reasonable geographic limitation. 2 0
"Whether a non-compete covenant is reasonable or overly broad is a question
of fact for the trial court. 2 1
212. FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(c) (2010).
213. See Supinski v. Omni Healthcare, P.A., 853 So. 2d 526, 531 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2003). But see Availability, Inc. v. Riley, 336 So. 2d 668, 670 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
214. Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon, 576 F.3d 1223, 1237 n.15, 1238 (lth Cir.
2009).
215. See Litwinczuk v. Palm Beach Cardiovascular Clinic, L.C., 939 So. 2d 268, 270 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
216. Id.
217. 826 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (per curiam).
218. See id. at 418.
219. See generally Health Care Fin. Enters., Inc. v. Levy, 715 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1998).
220. See id. at 343 (discussing that a restrictive covenant is not invalid because it fails to
contain a geographic limitation).
221. Whitby v. Infinity Radio, Inc., 951 So. 2d 890, 897 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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3. Damages
a. Liquidated Damages
Liquidated damages represent the best efforts of the parties to a contract
to agree upon a fixed amount of money recoverable by the non-breaching
party in the event of breach of contract.222 In assessing the validity of liqui-
dated damages clauses, courts ask two questions: (1) whether at contract
formation it was all but impossible to estimate what damages would be in the
event of breach, and (2) despite this uncertainty, the amount in the clause
reflects the best estimate of what those damages would be in the event of
breach.223 Any liquidated damages clause deemed a penalty is unenforcea-
ble.224 While liquidated damages clauses are generally disfavored in the law,
on the ground that often they result in forfeiture, those passing the two-part
test are enforceable, rendering unnecessary plaintiffs usual burden of prov-
ing actual damages. 225 While some courts apply the single-look doctrine,
under which the reasonableness of the amount contained in the liquidated
damages clause is measured only at the time of contract formation; other
courts apply the second look doctrine, in which reasonableness is measured
both at contract formation and at breach, thus, invalidating more liquidated
damages clauses than the single-look doctrine.2 26
Humana Medical Plan, Inc. v. Jacobson, 7 though decided under the
1990 non-compete statute, illustrates how Florida courts handle liquidated
damages clauses in non-compete agreements and how courts applying the
2281990 statute were far more wary of enforcing such restrictive covenants.
Ultimately, the Third District Court of Appeal, applying the single-look doc-
trine, threw out the liquidated damages clause on the ground that actual dam-
ages were readily ascertainable at contract formation.229 Invoking the Florida
Statutes recognizing the importance of patients making an informed choice
when selecting a physician, the Third District Court concluded, "Liquidated
222. Lefemine v. Baron, 573 So. 2d 326, 328 (Fla. 1991).
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. Id.; 25 C.J.S. Damages § 262 (2002).
226. Kelly v. Marx, 694 N.E.2d 869, 873-74 app. 1-2 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (illustrating
how twenty-two courts across the country favor the "single look" approach, whereas twenty
courts favor the "second look" approach), rev'd, 705 N.E.2d 1114, 1115-16 n.5 (Mass. 1999)
(rejecting the "second look" approach as the standard in Massachusetts while acknowledging
the "divided [courts] between the single and second look approach" across the country).
227. 614 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
228. Id. at 522.
229. See id.
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damages clauses... seriously impair patients' choice of a physician, by dis-
couraging doctors from continuing existing doctor/patient relationships.
230
Moreover, "public policy ... is violated when the business relationship an
HMO has with its affiliated doctors interferes with . . . the doctor/patient
relationship. 23'
b. Actual Damages
Under section 542.12, Florida's original non-compete statute, courts is-
sued injunctions if the alternative was only nominal damages because the
employer was unable to prove actual damages.232
In Proudfoot Consulting Co., the Eleventh Circuit addressed the ques-
23tion of damages under Florida's non-compete statute.  The Eleventh Cir-
cuit began its discussion of damages by saying, "'An award of damages for
breach of contract is intended to place the injured party in the position he or
she would have been in had the breach not occurred.', 234 The employer
"bears the burden to prove both that it sustained a loss and that 'its lost prof-
its were a direct result of'" the employee's breaches of the non-compete
agreement. 235 While "'uncertainty as to the precise amount of the lost profits
will not defeat recovery, so long as there is a reasonable yardstick by which
to estimate the damages,' causation must be 'proved with reasonable certain-
ty.'" 236 "Damages for breach of a non-compete [agreement] are intended to
make the prior employer whole, not to punish employees. 2 37 "[U]nder Flor-
ida law, disgorgement of profits earned is not a remedy for breach of con-
tract. ' 238 The Eleventh Circuit did suggest, however, that lost profits might
be recoverable in an action for unjust enrichment.239
230. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 458.301 (2010).
231. Humana Med. Plan, Inc., 614 So. 2d at 522.
232. Miller Mech., Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So. 2d 11, 12-13 (Fla. 1974); FLA. STAT. § 542.12
(1979 & Supp. 1980) (renumbered 1980).
233. Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon, 576 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2009) (revers-
ing a $1.66 million damages award to a former employer); see generatly FLA. STAT. § 542.33
(2010).
234. Proudfoot Consulting Co., 576 F.3d at 1242 (alteration in original) (quoting Mne-
monics, Inc. v. Max Davis Assocs., Inc., 808 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2002)).
235. Id. at 1243 (quoting Whitby v. Infinity Radio, Inc., 951 So. 2d 890, 898 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2007)).
236. Id. (quoting Nebula Glass Int'l, Inc. v. Reichhold, Inc., 454 F.3d 1203, 1217 (1 1th
Cir. 2006)).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1245.
239. Proudfoot Consulting Co., 576 F.3d at 1245-46 n.27.
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c. Attorney's Fees
Grant and Steele point out, as yet another defect of Florida's 1990 non-
compete statute, that section 542.33 contained no provision authorizing at-
torney's fees to prevailing parties.24 °  In support of adding section
542.335(1)(k) in 1996, authorizing the awarding of such fees, Grant and
Steele claim, "Unless the contract itself had such a provision, the parties
[bore] their own litigation expenses .... [T]his deficiency encouraged ab-
usive litigation strategies and tactics.
' 241
Now, however, that Florida's non-compete statute so soundly stacks the
deck in favor of enforcing such restrictive covenants, the possibility that in-
sult will add to injury in the form of attorney's fees, if a former employee
challenges enforcement of such non-compete agreements further chills such
individuals' efforts to maintain their livelihoods.2 42
There is a district court split over whether section 542.335(l)(k) applies
243
to a non-party to a written restrictive covenant. 2  For example, when a rival
employer is a named defendant in an action to enforce a non-compete
agreement, but is a non-party to the restrictive covenant, can attorney's fees
be assessed against him as well if the former employer prevails in its action?
In Sun Group Enterprises, Inc. v. DeWitte,244 the trial court awarded attor-
ney's fees to the defendants-including the subsequent employer, a non-
party to the restrictive covenant between the former employer and the former
employees-because they had "successfully challenged the enforceability of
a restrictive covenant." 245 By contrast, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
Bauer v. DILIB, Inc., 246 concluded that the attorney's fee provision in the
current non-compete statute did not authorize the former employer to recover
its attorney's fees from the non-party, the former employees' subsequent
employer.247
240. Grant & Steele, supra note 8, at 54.
241. Id.
242. See FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(k) (2010).
243. Compare Sun Grp. Enters., Inc., v. DeWitte, 890 So. 2d 410, 412 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2004), with Bauer v. DILIB, Inc., 16 So. 3d 318, 322 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
244. 890 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
245. Id. at 412.
246. 16 So. 3d 318 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
247. Id. at 319.
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4. Other Remedies
In Making Noncompete Agreements Work for Employers,248 Robert B.
Gordon suggests:
[Ulnilateral employer action (such as... cancellation of stock op-
tions or restricted equity, termination of severance payments, and
the like) ... are remedies that employers can implement on their
own initiative, at no cost, and with only a modest risk that an em-
ployee might elect to initiate a lawsuit to challenge the claw-
back.249
V. CONCLUSION
Like most states, Florida enforces physician non-compete agreements in
employment.25 0  Also, like most states, Florida strictly construes non-
compete agreements among lawyers, in law firms, on grounds of public poli-
cy. 251 Logically, there is no basis for treating the physician-patient relation-
ship any less sympathetically than the lawyer-client relationship. For this
reason, physician non-compete agreements should be as narrowly construed,
as lawyer non-compete agreements are, under Florida law and for analogous
public policy reasons.
248. Robert B. Gordon, Making Noncompete Agreements Work for Employers, CORP.
COUNS. WKLY. (Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Inc., Arlington, Va.), Oct. 14, 2009, at 1.
249. Id. at 2.
250. See, e.g., Supinski v. Omni Healthcare, P.A., 853 So. 2d 526, 529-30 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2003).
251. Fla. Bar Prof I Ethics Comm., Op. 93-4 (1995).
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